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RESISTING "SWEAT" AND REFUSING FEIST:
RETHINKING ORIGINALITY AFTER CCH
CARYS J. CRAIGt
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ORIGINALITY DOCTRINE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law offers protection for original works of artistic,
literary, dramatic, or musical expression.1 Originality is "the
foundation stone of copyright"2 and the defining characteristic of
copyrightable expression. Like many aspects of intellectual
property law, it is easy to state the basic need for originality, but it
is far harder to ascertain what this means. How should originality
be understood?
It is trite to say that absolute originality is impossible: We are
always already part of that which surrounds us and preceded us.
Even in our so-called "creativity", we all stand on the proverbial
shoulders of giants. The search for the meaning of originality may
therefore appear wholly abstract--of interest to artists,
philosophers, and critics, but beyond the practical concerns of the
law. However, the copyright system requires consideration of the
creative processes that it aims to encourage, and the way that we
t LL.B. (Hons), LL.M., S.J.D., Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law
School. I would like to thank Abraham Drassinower and Ariel Katz for their
helpful comments. Thanks also to the participants of the Intellectual Property
Works-in-Progress Colloquium at the Boston University College of Law, 2004,
and the Fourth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at the DePaul
University College of Law. In particular, I am grateful for the thoughtful
feedback of Mark Lemley, Roberta Kwall, and Margaret Ann Wilkinson.
' Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 5(1) states: "Subject to this Act,
copyright shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in every
original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work . [emphasis added].
2 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006 SCC 43 at para. 35, 353 N.R. 104, 217
O.A.C. 332 [Robertson (S.C.C.)].
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understand these creative processes and their results will
determine how copyright functions. If copyright were to require
absolute originality, it could function only upon a myth. If
copyright were to require originality in the sense of inventiveness
or imagination, it would be a very different creature: offering
greatly restricted protection, perhaps requiring application and
registration, and demanding determinations of prior art and
comparisons across works. In short, it would look more like
patent law. Copyright that vests automatically upon creation, that
requires no registration, and that refuses to discriminate based
upon the quality of a work, must ask for something less. But how
much less can copyright demand before originality becomes a
redundant criterion?
Because originality erects the boundaries of copyright, the
demands of the originality doctrine directly affect the kinds of
works to which copyright protection may extend. Works that
traditionally sit at the core of copyrightable expression-novels,
poems, paintings, films, songs, and so forth-are rarely affected
by the particular definition of originality: In the absence of
copying from a pre-existing work, such expressions will almost
invariably meet whatever minimal threshold of creative
authorship is required. It is at the margins of copyright that the
originality doctrine becomes crucial. Generally speaking, these
marginal works are not primarily aesthetic-they do not have
creative or artistic expression as their primary purpose-but
rather, they are utilitarian in nature, intended primarily to perform
a practical or useful function. Common examples in the case law
include blank accounting forms,3 competition rules,4 betting
coupons,5 and most famously, telephone directories.6 These
3 See e.g. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), 25 L. Ed. 841; cf Bulman
Group Ltd. v. 'One-Write' Accounting Systems Ltd., [1982] 2 F.C. 327, 62
C.P.R. (2d) 149 (T.D.).
4 See e.g. Moreau v. St. Vincent, [1950] Ex. C.R. 198, [1950] 3 D.L.R. 713;
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, 379 F.2d 675, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
193 (1st Cir. 1967).
5 See e.g. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1
All E.R. 465, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (H.L.) [Ladbroke cited to All E.R.].
6 See e.g. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, 111
S. Ct. 1282 (10th Cir. 1991) [Feist cited to U.S.]; Tele-Direct (Publications) v.
American Business Information [1998] 2 F.C. 22, 37 B.L.R. (2d) 101 (C.A.)
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routine functional works exist at the peripheries of copyright's
protective sphere (in originality's "penumbra of doubt"), and fit
imperfectly within the classical copyright paradigm. Typically, it
is not the literary or artistic expression of these works that is of
the greatest value to the would-be copyright owner; rather, their
value resides in the function that they perform, or the information
that they contain. It is no surprise that these are the-works over
which the boundaries of copyright must be fought out.
The originality debate has evolved around two prominent
schools of thought: the "sweat school" and the "creativity school".
According to the "sweat school", originality requires only the
"sweat of one's brow". To invest time, labour, or effort into a
work's production entitles one to protection against those who
would seek to benefit from one's pains. Works that are not copied
and that involve industry on the part of their creator are entitled to
the protections afforded by copyright. In practical terms, this
means that copyright is capable of extending to mundane
functional works such as garden-variety compilations of
information. Contrast this with the "creativity school", whose
adherents advocate the need for genuine authorship as evidenced
by a creative spark: a modicum or scintilla of creativity or
ingenuity in addition to merely not copying. Depending upon how
the creativity standard is formulated and applied, it raises the bar
for copyrightability, depriving garden-variety compilations of
copyright on the rationale that industry is not the same as
authorship.
Simply put, the originality threshold for copyrightability can
be raised or lowered to either exclude or embrace the works at
copyright's margins. Whether such works deserve copyright's
protection is ultimately a policy question, the answer to which
will largely depend upon the perceived purposes of the copyright
system. Far from being a matter of semantics, the formulation of
the originality standard thus reverberates with theoretical
perspectives, political implications, and practical consequences:
The foundations of the copyright interest and its justifications are
encapsulated in the standard erected for copyright's subsistence.
[Tele-Direct]; Desktop Marketing Systems Pty. Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. Ltd., [2002]
FCAFC 112, 192 A.L.R. 433.
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B. CCH v. LA WSOCIETYOF UPPER CANADA
In the case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
Canada,7 the Supreme Court of Canada had an opportunity to
weigh in on the meaning of originality in Canadian copyright law.
The plaintiffs were legal publishers who sought a declaration of
subsistence and ownership of copyright in headnotes, summaries,
a topical index, and a compilation of reported judicial decisions.8
Released on 4 March 2004, the ruling ostensibly settled the debate
that had long been waged in Canada between the "sweat school"
and the "creativity school". The Supreme Court rejected the Court
of Appeal's formulation of originality, which had essentially
reduced originality to a synonym for "not copying". 9 In doing so,
the Supreme Court rejected a standard based upon industry or
labour alone.1 ° The Supreme Court also rejected the "minimal
degree of creativity" test, which had been famously adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in the 1991 case Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service.11 The appropriate
threshold for originality, according to the Supreme Court of
Canada, "falls between these two extremes" and requires "an
exercise of skill and judgment." 2
This article will examine the meaning and significance of the
"skill and judgment" test by contrasting it against previous
articulations of originality in Canada, and current standards in the
United Kingdom and the United States. The premise behind my
methodology is that the "skill and judgment" test is best
understood in light of what it leaves out-the alternative
7 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 395 [CCH (SCC.)
cited to S.C.R.].
8 Ibid. The plaintiff publishers included CCH Canadian Ltd., Thomson
Canada Ltd., and Canada Law Book Inc. The publishers were ultimately
successful in obtaining the declaration of copyright subsistence and ownership,
but nonetheless failed to obtain an injunction against the Great Library, whose
activity was found by the Supreme Court to be neither direct infringement (the
dealing was fair), nor indirect infringement (there was no implied authorization
of infringing activity).
9 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2002 FCA 187,
[2002] F.C. 213, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [CCH(F.CA.) cited to F.C.].
10 CCH(S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 351-52.
" Feist, supra note 6.
12 CCH (S.CC.), supra note 7 at 352.
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approaches that the Court could easily have adopted, but chose,
instead, to reject. I argue that, by avoiding a traditional sweat-
based approach and refusing an American Feist-like approach, the
CCH ruling has potentially freed the concept of originality from
the kinds of "labour" and "creativity" conceits that have tended to
define it. In doing so, it has paved the way for the re-imagination
of originality in an instrumental mode: Originality is not the root
of the author's entitlement, but a functional doctrine, the meaning
and application of which is guided by the purposes of the
copyright system. The CCH case has thus provided a much-
needed opportunity to develop an originality standard in Canadian
copyright law that coheres with the public policy goals that justify
the copyright system-an opportunity that we are already in
danger of missing.
In Part II, I provide more detail about the CCH case and the
jurisprudential background against which it emerged. The
discussion that follows in Part III considers the significance of the
absence of "labour" in the "skill and judgment" standard. In Part
IV, I explore the Court's decision to also exclude "creativity"
from the test, with reference to the civilian copyright tradition and
the philosophy that underpins it. Part V examines the use of the
creativity standard in the United States and its possible impact
upon the Canadian position. In Part VI, I conclude that, consistent
with the Supreme Court's reasoning, rights-based originality
inquiries into the degree of labour or personality invested in a
work ought to be put aside. In their place, the public policy goals
of copyright should be allowed to define the scope and limits of
copyright protection through the vehicle of originality.
II. SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE SUPREME COURT
A. CONFUSION IN CANADIAN COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE LEADUP TO CCH
In order to appreciate the significance of the Supreme Court's
ruling in CCH, it is important to understand the legal context
within which the case arose. Each court that considered the case,
from the Trial Division to the Supreme Court, relied upon a
different definition of the originality threshold to make its
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
determination. The confusion and inconsistency displayed in these
rulings 3 was merely reflective of the tensions and contradictions
that had characterized judicial determinations of originality for
many years:
[A]rising in part from the tensions inherent in Canada's bijural
tradition and the influence of American law on domestic doctrine, the
most recent cases have tended to complicate matters by alternatively
pulling towards and pushing away from conceptions of creative
authorship in general and specifically in respect of compilations of
factual material. In the process, the law has become uncertain both in
doctrine and direction. 14
Some courts remained vigorously aligned with the traditional
British approach, requiring only that a work be not copied but
independently created, 5 while others, also drawing upon U.K.
precedent, spoke interchangeably of "skill, judgment, or labour"
and "work, taste and discretion". 6 Illuminating the tension in
Canada between civil and common law principles, decisions in
the Quebec courts spoke of "a certain personal effort"
accompanied by "knowledge, skill, time, reflection, judgment and
imagination". 7 Others spoke of the importance of demonstrating
'3 See Part IIB, below.
14 David Freedman, "Revising Canadian Database Protection: What
Lessons From Europe?" 81 Can. Bar Rev. 563 at 593.
15 See e.g. British Columbia Jockey Club. v. Standen, 22 D.L.R. (4th) 467 at
471, 8 C.P.R. (3d) 283 (B.C.C.A.) [B.C. Jockey cited to D.L.R.], which agreed
with the proposition that facts included in a compilation can be the subject of
copyright protection "when those facts are novel and are the result of
independent research and labour." The most widely cited case employing this
"traditional" threshold is University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial
Press. Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 608-09, 32 T.L.R. 698: "[T]he Act does not
require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the
work must not be copied from another work-that it should originate from the
author." The British approach is discussed in more detail in Part II.B.i, below.
16 Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. Ltd. v. Sleep-King Adjustable Bed
Co. Ltd. (1984), 3 C.P.R. (3d) 81 at para. 17, [1984] 1 W.W.R. 112 (B.C.S.C.),
McLachlin J. (as she then was).
17 Editions Hurtubise HMH lte c. C~gep Andr -Laurendeau (1989), 24
C.I.P.R. 248 at para. 55, [1989] R.J.Q. 1003 (C.S.) [translated by author];
approved by Dube J. in Edutile Inc. v. Automobile Protection Assn. (1997), 81
C.P.R. (3d) 338, 78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 141 (F.C.T.D.), and Gibson J. in CCH
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2000] 2 F.C. 451, 179 D.L.R.
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a "minimum of creativity", while nevertheless classifying as
infringement the unauthorized adoption of another's "labour or
effort."' 8 In 1995, in the U & R Tax Services case,' 9 the Federal
Court asserted "industriousness ('sweat of the brow') as opposed
to creativity is enough to give a work sufficient originality to
make it copyrightable."2 ° Justice Richard in this case found that
"labour or time expended is sufficient" to attract copyright,2 '
while also citing with approval earlier dictum that a copyrightable
work must be the product of "labour and skill"22 and pointing to
the "skill and judgment" of the author.23
The Federal Court of Appeal had a chance to add its voice to
the discussion two years later, in the controversial case of Tele-
Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc. 24
The court acknowledged that a "battle [had been] shaping up in
Canada between partisans of the 'creativity' doctrine ... and the
partisans of the 'industrious collection' or 'sweat of the brow'
doctrine .... ,2S and proceeded to declare victory for the creativity
school that had already triumphed in the United States. While
denying any departure from Anglo-Canadian principles, Justice
DeCary expressed the opinion that "Canadian courts should not
hesitate to adopt an interpretation that satisfies both the Anglo-
Canadian standards and the American standards [following
(4th) 609 (T.D.) [CCH (F.CT.D.) cited to F.C.]. The civilian tradition regards
the author's right as flowing naturally from the investment of his or her
personality in the work, such that the author's protected expression is, in a sense,
the extension of the author. I have addressed the divergent copyright theories
underlying different approaches to originality in more detail elsewhere: see
Carys Craig, "The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright: Authorship,
Reward & the Public Interest" (2005) 2 University of Ottawa Law & Technology
Journal 425 [Craig, "Evolution of Originality"].
18 Caron v. Assoc. des Pompiers de Montreal Inc. (1992), 42 C.P.R. (3d)
292 at 295, 297, 54 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.).
19 U & R Tax Services Ltd. v. H & R Block Canada Inc. (1995), 62 C.P.R.
(3d) 257, 97 F.T.R. 259 [U & R Tax].
20 Ibid. at para. 22.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. [emphasis added].
23 Ibid. at para. 17.
24 Supra note 6.
25 Ibid. at para. 13.
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Feist]",26 not least because international treaties appeared to
bridge the divide.27 On its face, the case appeared indicative of an
arguably inevitable trend towards the Americanization of
traditional Anglo-Canadian copyright law.
As I will explain in more detail in the following section, the
Trial Division in the CCH case based its decision upon Tele-
Direct's unambiguous endorsement of a "creativity" standard. On
appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal issued a dramatic turnabout
ruling, reducing the originality bar to virtual obsolescence.
Compounding the doubt that already surrounded the doctrine, the
Federal Court of Appeal thereby released two apparently
contradictory decisions on the meaning of originality within five
years, each purporting to settle the question. Predictably, there
was continuing confusion about the precise standard that emerged
from the Court of Appeal in CCH,28 and still more uncertainty
26 Ibid. at para. 18.
27 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of
Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17
December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force I
January 1994), art. 1705, which referred to "intellectual creations", played an
important role in DeCary J.'s reasoning: "The use of these ... two words is most
revealing: compilations of data are to be measured by standards of intellect and
creativity.... I can only assume that the Canadian Government in signing the
Agreement and the Canadian Parliament in adopting the 1993 amendments to the
Copyright Act expected the Court to follow the 'creativity' school of cases rather
than the 'industrious collection' school": Tele-Direct, supra note 6 at para. 15.
On the weaknesses of this line of reasoning, see Myra J. Tawfik, "Decompiling
the Federal Court of Appeal's 'Nafta Argument' in Tele-Direct (Publications)
Inc. v. American Business Information Inc.-From Facts to Fiction" (2001) 33
Ottawa L. Rev. 147.
28 See e.g. Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees' Union, 2003
BCSC 807, 226 D.L.R. (4th) 563 at 569-70, 25 C.P.R. (4th) 172, where the
court, citing Linden J. in CCH (F. C.T.D.), stated: "[T]here must be evidence of
skill, judgment or labour in the overall selection or arrangement . With
respect, this statement of the law was in line with the ruling of Rothstein J., but
Linden J. had refused to regard either skill, judgment or labour as necessary
prerequisites to protection. A more accurate account of Linden J.'s ruling was
given in Great Canadian Oil Change Ltd v. Dynamic Ventures Corp., 2002
BCSC 1295 at para. 43, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, 21 C.P.R. (4th) 318: "The work
is 'original' if it was independently produced and not copied." Furthermore, in
Delrina Corp. (c.o.b. Carolian Systems) v. Triolet Systems Inc., 165 O.A.C. 160
at para. 28, 22 C.P.R. (4th) 32, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2002]
S.C.C.A. No. 189 [Delrina], the Ontario Court of Appeal appeared to adopt a
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about whether Tele-Direct had been overruled, reinterpreted, or
merely distinguished. Until the opportunity of the Law Society's
appeal in the CCH case presented itself, the Supreme Court had
not had occasion to speak to the issue of originality. Now, the
lawyers, scholars, students, and stakeholders of Canada's
copyright system were eager for a definitive resolution.
B. THE CCH CASE IN THE COURTS
The meaning of originality was unlikely to be a pivotal or
deciding issue at the Supreme Court: Most of the works were
capable of meeting the threshold, whether high or low.29 The
Supreme Court gave the originality doctrine more attention than
the arguments before the Court would have demanded,
presumably with the goal of settling the question that had caused
such uncertainty in the lower courts.
At trial, Justice Gibson had issued a surprising judgment that
endorsed the "expansion of the traditional criteria of judgment,
skill and labour" to reflect the "creativity aspect inherent in the
concept of originality."3 While the use of a "creativity" standard
may not have proved too controversial following the Federal
Court of Appeal's earlier ruling in Tele-Direct,31 its application
certainly was: Justice Gibson refused to find original expression
in reported judicial decisions, including headnotes, catchlines,
U.S. based "abstraction-filtration-comparison" approach to determine
infringement in a case concerning the non-literal copying of a computer
program. This appeared to follow the approach of the U.S. 2nd Circuit in
Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 119 A.L.R.
Fed. 741 (2d Cir. 1992). At the "filtration" stage of the infringement analysis, the
court filtered out routine parts of the program that may well have attracted
copyright protection under the Federal Court of Appeal's minimalist originality
test. If U.S. authority was to be followed in infringement but not subsistence
determinations, this could create further confusion, and potentially pose a threat
to the internal consistency of Canadian copyright policy and doctrine: see Robert
G. Howell, "Recent Copyright Developments: Harmonization Opportunities for
Canada" (2003-2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 149,
Section 2.
29 My thanks to Barry Sookman of McCarthy T~trault LLP for this
observation.
30 CCH (F.C.T.D.), supra note 17 at 471.
31 Supra note 6. See Part II.A, above.
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parallel citations, and running heads.32 It seems correct to say that
originality is limited when the main attribute of a work is skillful
faithfulness to the original.33 However, when one takes the
example of a case headnote and considers the skill, knowledge,
judgment, labour-and, arguably, the minimum degree of
creativity-involved in identifying, selecting, and arranging the
relevant facts and ratio of a court decision, it also seems that the
Trial Division ruling raised the originality bar too high.
34
Certainly, that was the opinion of the Federal Court of Appeal.
It was open to the Court of Appeal to reach a different conclusion
on the facts while affirming "creativity" as the applicable
standard. Instead, the Court dismissed the "creativity" standard as
a misinterpretation of the Court of Appeal's decision in Tele-
Direct and a distortion of the "traditional Anglo-Canadian
approach".35 According to the Court of Appeal, this classic
approach required as a precondition to copyright only that a work
be "independently produced and not copied from another
person. ' , 36 Pursuant to this test, any work that was more than a
mere copy would meet the originality threshold. I would suggest
that the standard as it emerged from the Court of Appeal was
perhaps even lower than a traditional 'sweat of the brow'
standard, which would generally require that the author
"demonstrate that he or she has expended a significant effort in
32 Having acknowledged that such additions "involved extensive labour,
skill and judgment", he nevertheless found that they lacked "the 'imagination' or
'creative spark' ... essential to a finding of originality": CCH (F.C.T.D.), supra
note 17 at 474.
33 Ibid. at paras. 471-72.
34 This was ultimately the conclusion of the Supreme Court on this issue:
"Although headnotes are inspired in large part by the judgement which they
summarize and refer to, they are clearly not an identical copy of the reasons. The
authors must select specific elements of the decision and can arrange them in
numerous different ways. Making these decisions requires the exercise of skill
and judgment. The authors must use their knowledge about the law and
developed ability to determine legal ratios to produce the headnotes. They must
also use their capacity for discernment to decide which parts of the judgement
warrant inclusion in the headnotes. This process is more than just a mechanical
exercise. Thus the headnotes constitute 'original' works in which copyright
subsists": CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 358, McLachlin C.J.C.
35 CCH (F.C.A.), supra note 9 at 242, Linden J.A.
36 Ibid. at 246.
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creating the work."37 For Justice Linden, "labour" itself was only
a possible ingredient in the production of an original work that
was not copied, and not a prerequisite: a "worthy attribute" but
not a requirement.38 This is about as low as the originality
threshold can go, if it can be described as a threshold at all.
With the Trial Division and Court of Appeal rulings swinging
from an elevated version of the creativity standard to a de minimis
version of the sweat standard, it is easy to understand why the
Supreme Court was compelled to enter the fray. It is less clear,
however, why the court chose to define originality as it did. My
purpose in this paper is to suggest and explore some possible and
compelling explanations for this choice. While it is, admittedly, a
fine line to walk, my ultimate aim in this task is not to speculate
upon or assume the actual reasons behind the Court's ruling, but
rather to propose a way of reading the ruling that opens up a
critical space for doctrinal innovation.
37 Mark J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 14. But note that, at the Supreme Court,
McLachlin C.J.C. described the Court of Appeal's ruling as having "adopted the
'sweat of the brow' approach to originality": CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 357.
38 CCH (F.C.A.), supra note 9 at 254-55: "It is widely accepted that an
'original' work must be independently produced and not copied.... [D]ifferent
judges and commentators have described the word 'original' with a host of
words and phrases mentioned above, including various combinations of the
terms 'labour', judgment', 'skill', 'work', 'industry', 'effort', 'taste', or
'discretion'.... To me, these are all possible ingredients in the recipe for
originality, which may be altered to suit the flavour of the work at issue.... [I]t is
a mistake to treat any of these words as if they were statutory requirements.
These are not, in themselves, prerequisites to copyright protection, but rather
evidence of the sole prerequisite, originality." As such, if someone were to
produce a work without copying directly from another work, but without
expending any significant labour, effort, time or expense in the process,
copyright would nevertheless subsist even in the absence of industriousness.
This stands in contrast with Rothstein J.'s approach. Rothstein J. proposed
an "intellectual effort" standard would have established a slightly higher
threshold than that articulated by Linden J.'s (and endorsed by Sharlow J.), and
would seem better able to embrace a genuine sweat of the brow test. For
Rothstein J., "something in addition to not being copied is required" for a work
to be original, whether that something is skill, judgment, and/or labour, or purely
effort, time, and/or expense. This "intellectual effort" test could therefore have
embraced a standard requiring only labour in addition to not copying. See CCH
(F.C.A.), supra note 9 at 466-68.
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C. INTRODUCING THE "SKILL AND JUDGMENT" TEST
As a starting point for this discussion, it is worth reproducing the
most pertinent passages of the Chief Justice McLachlin's
judgment. On the matter of the originality debate, she explained:
There are competing views on the meaning of "original" in copyright
law. Some courts have found that a work that originates from an
author and is more than a mere copy of a work is sufficient to ground
copyright .... This approach is consistent with the "sweat of the
brow" or "industriousness" standard of originality, which is premised
on a natural rights or Lockean theory of "just desserts", namely that
an author deserves to have his or her efforts in producing a work
rewarded. Other courts have required that a work must be creative to
be "original" and thus protected by copyright .... This approach is
also consistent with a natural rights theory of property law; however
it is less absolute in that only those works that are the product of
creativity will be rewarded with copyright protection.39
On the correct approach to determining originality, the Chief
Justice concluded:
... [T]he correct position falls between these extremes. For a work to
be "original" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, it must be
more than a mere copy of another work. At the same time, it need not
be creative, in the sense of being novel or unique. What is required to
attract copyright protection in the expression of an idea is an exercise
of skill and judgment.... This exercise of skill and judgment will
necessarily involve intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and
judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it
could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.4 °
By requiring the kind of intellectual effort that involves skill
and judgment on the part of an author, the Court excluded from
copyright's protective sphere works that involve sheer effort or
labour of a mechanical or automatic nature. It would thereby deny
copyright to routine, garden-variety compilations that are the
result of mere sweat. On the other side of the doctrinal divide, the
Court also refused to accept the "Feistian" premise that the
necessary intellectual effort requires some element of minimum
39 CCH (S. C.C), supra note 7 at 351-52 [footnotes omitted].
40 Ibid. at 352.
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creativity. The Court thus purported to bring within copyright's
protective sphere the kinds of works that involved some degree of
skill and judgment, but lack what one might properly call
"creativity"."
Importantly, in propounding a threshold based upon skill and
judgment, the Court expressly rejected as inappropriate extremes
both the minimalist, industriousness test drawn from the British
case law, and the elevated creativity standard now found in the
U.S. context. In the discussion that follows, I will examine the
departure from industry- and creativity-based standards, and
propose an interpretation of this decision that reimagines the
meaning and function of originality in Canadian copyright
doctrine.
III. WHAT HAPPENED TO "LABOUR"?
Arguably, the most critical point of departure in CCH from
previous or alternative articulations of originality is the absence of
the word "labour"-or its common companion, "effort"-from
the "skill and judgment" test. The labour invested in the
production of a work has traditionally had a significant role to
play in determinations of originality in common law copyright.
Clearly, the notion of reward for one's labour forms the crux of
the "sweat of the brow" approach to originality,42 but "labour" has
also appeared in various articulations of originality that demanded
more than mere "sweat of the brow. 4 3
41 "While creative works will by definition be 'original' and covered by
copyright, creativity is not required to make a work 'original': ibid. at 356.
There may, however, be cause to doubt the practical significance of this
distinction: see Part V.A, below.
42 McLachlin C.J.C. described the "sweat of the brow" approach as
"premised on a natural rights or Lockean theory of 'just deserts', namely that an
author deserves to have his or her efforts in producing a work rewarded": CCH
(S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 351-52. A full examination of the relevance of the
author's labour in common law copyright regimes is beyond my purposes here.
For further discussion of labour-based reasoning and its consequences, see Carys
J. Craig, "Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A Warning Against a
Lockean Approach to Copyright Law" (2002) 28 Queen's L.J. I [Craig,
"Locke"].
43 See Part Ill. B, below.
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In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court was concerned
with the need to ensure that information remains within the public
domain and free from private appropriation. However, the
Supreme Court's ruling could be said to contain a broader
proposition: namely, that mere labour is simply not part of the
copyright equation. If true, the decision to exclude labour from
the originality doctrine represents a larger theoretical shift than
may be apparent on its face. In order to make this argument, I will
show that the rejection of pure "sweat of the brow" and the desire
to leave information in the public domain did not necessitate the
exclusion of "labour". In my view, the first step towards
understanding the "skill and judgment" test is thus to
acknowledge the Court's choice to leave "labour" out; the next
step is to recognize, in this choice, a repudiation of the labour-
reward theory of copyright.
A. PROTECTING LABOUR; PROTECTING INFORMATION
The primary basis for rejecting a "sweat of the brow" approach
appears to have been concern about its ability to extend copyright
protection to facts and information contained in protected works.
In Feist, the U.S. Supreme Court, when rejecting a "sweat of the
brow" approach, identified as its "most glaring" flaw:
[T]hat it extended copyright protection in a compilation beyond
selection and arrangement-the compiler's original contributions-
to the facts themselves.... "Sweat of the brow" courts thereby
eschewed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law-that no one
may copyright facts or ideas. 44
When the Supreme Court of Canada rejected "sweat of the brow"
in CCH, it did so with an appeal to the reasoning of Justice
O'Connor in this passage. Chief Justice McLachlin agreed: "[I]n
Canada, as in the United States, copyright protection does not
extend to facts or ideas but is limited to the expression of ideas. 45
44 Supra note 6 at 353.
45 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 355. As observed by O'Connor J. in Feist,
supra note 6 at 347: "'No one may claim originality as to facts'. This is because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creativity and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular
fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To
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On this basis, she found that "O'Connor J.'s concerns about the
'sweat of the brow' doctrine's improper extension of copyright
over facts also resonate in Canada.,
46
The best example of the improper extension of copyright over
facts in a Canadian context remains the case of British Columbia
Jockey Club et al. v. Standen.47 The plaintiffs produced a
publication in advance of each day of horse racing, imparting
information on the races, horses, jockeys, and conditions for the
day ahead. The defendant's publication adopted much of this
information, but in a form that was "not at all similar", 48 and
included additional comments and preferences. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal noted at the outset of its judgment that
"[a] good deal of work has to be performed before publication of
the [plaintiffs] 'Overnight'", 49 and ultimately affirmed "the right
of the Club to protect its compilation of information as a whole",
notwithstanding that the defendant had "adopted that information
to his own style". 5° The Court of Appeal shared the trial judge's
view that the defendant had taken "a substantial part of this
compilation made by the plaintiff at a great deal of cost and
trouble to himself', 5' and that this was a sufficient basis upon
which to find infringement. It was also satisfied that the legal
foundation for the ruling could be found in the passages quoted by
the judge, which appealed to the "painstaking labour"52 or the
"independent research and labour"53 involved in compiling the
facts, and stated that "no man is entitled to avail himself of the
previous labours of another for the purpose of conveying to the
borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its 'maker' or
'originator.' III U.S. at 58."
46 Ibid.
47 Supra note 15. See also Weetman (c.o.b. Beta Digital Mapping) v.
Baldwin, 2001 BCPC 292; B & S Publications Inc. v. Max-Contracts Inc.,
(2001) 287 A.R. 201.
48 B.C. Jockey, supra note 15 at 469.
49 Ibid. at 468.
'0 Ibid. at 470.
"' Ibid. at 471-72.
52 Ibid. at 470, citing Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott & Mary Vitoria, The
Modern Law of Copyright (London: Butterworths, 1980) at para. 2.65.
53 B.C. Jockey, supra note 15 at 471, citing Harold Fox, The Canadian Law
of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1967) at 329.
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public the same information".54 The plaintiff's entitlement was
rooted in the cost, trouble, and labour invested.
The B.C. Jockey case illustrates how a labour-based originality
standard can confer exclusivity over the facts or information
contained in a protected work to the detriment of downstream
users and the public. When the basis for the copyright holder's
right in an informational work is the painstaking labour of
collection, taking the information gathered will amount to
appropriating the very fruits of the labour that copyright
protects.55 The copyright interest does not in itself confer a
monopoly over the information, for the same information can be
discovered, recorded, and published by another without liability.56
But the key to this lawful reproduction of data is independent
creation.57 Thus, the number of milestones that separate two
towns may be a fact that cannot be exclusively owned, but a
"sweat of the brow" approach will protect the labour expended by
the first person to count those miles against those who wish to
rely upon his efforts to impart the same information. In this sense,
the exclusive right does offer protection to the information,
although it remains independently discoverable. However, where
the source of the original compilation of information is the sole
source of the information, as was the case in B.C. Jockey,
54 B.C. Jockey, supra note 15 at 470, citing Wood V.-C. in Scott v. Stanford
(1867), L.R. 3 Eq. 718 at 724, 16 L.T. 51, cited in Laddie, Prescott, Vitoria,
supra note 52 at para. 2.65.
55 If copyright protects the author's industrious effort in compiling material,
it follows that "the copyright in such a work may be infringed by appropriating
an undue amount of the material": B.C. Jockey, supra note 15 at 470, citing
Laddie, Prescott, Vitoria, supra note 52 at para. 2.65. As one commentator has
observed: "If there is a fine line between protecting the original work in which
copyright subsists and protecting a plaintiffs expenses and efforts in creating the
work, this case would appear to cross it": Teresa Scassa, "Originality and
Utilitarian Works: The Uneasy Relationship between Copyright and Unfair
Competition" (2003-4) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 51 at
para. 41.
56 See Norman Siebrasse, "Copyright in Facts and Information: Feist Is Not,
and Should Not Be, the Law in Canada" (1994) 11 C.I.P.R. 191.
57 As was famously stated in the English case of Kelly v. Morris, [1866]
L.R. 1 Eq. 697 at 701, 14 L.T. 222 [Kelly cited to L.R.Eq.]: "A subsequent
compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that which the first compiler has
done. In case of a road-book, he must count the milestones for himself."
VOL. 40:1
2007 RESISTING "SWEAT" AND REFUSING FEIST 85
copyright confers a de facto monopoly; in such cases, independent
discoverability is no more than a fictional limit to the exclusivity
conferred.
The indirect grant of control over facts through copyright is
widely controversial, not least because it may seem to run counter
to the fundamental value that our society attaches to knowledge
and the free flow of information. Furthermore, to the extent that
copyright is regarded as a vehicle to encourage the maximum
generation and exchange of intellectual works in the public
interest 58 (or in the terms of the U.S. Constitution, "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts"59), the freedom of the public
to use the ideas and information expressed in such works would
appear to be an essential element of copyright's social purpose.6"
Even at a practical level, the "count your own milestones"
approach can appear counterproductive to the extent that it
requires a duplication of effort without resulting in any added
value to the work or further benefit to the public.6 While the
58 I have argued elsewhere that copyright should be regarded from a public
interest perspective as "a policy tool whose purpose is to advance our common
interest in the vibrant social exchange of meaning" through the encouragement
of intellectual expression: Carys J. Craig, "Putting the Community in
Communication: Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and
Copyright Law" (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 75 at 108-11.
59 U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
60 The perceived importance of the freedom of ideas and information to the
furtherance of copyright policy was a significant factor in both Feist and CCH.
As O'Connor J. explained in Feist, supra note 6 at 350: "To this end, copyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." Similarly,
McLachlin C.J.C. remarked, a higher standard "helps ensure that copyright
protection only extends to the expression of ideas as opposed to the underlying
ideas or facts": CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 2 at 352. The skill and judgment test
was therefore appropriate because it "helps ensure that there is room for the
public domain to flourish as others are able to produce new works by building on
the ideas and information contained in the works of others": CCH (S.C.C.),
supra note 7 at para. 23.
61 In Feist, supra note 6 at 354, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that
courts applying "sweat of the brow" were effectively declaring that "authors are
absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by relying upon the facts
contained in prior works. In truth, 'it is just such wasted effort that the
proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts ... [is] designed to prevent.'
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 at 310 (CA2
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rationale behind the exclusion of facts from copyright was not
identified or explained by the Supreme Court, the Court
unambiguously endorsed the proposition that "copyright
protection does not extend to facts".62
The Chief Justice's rejection of a pure labour-based standard
for protection should therefore be understood as a rejection of any
version of originality that would indirectly confer exclusive rights
over information. This is the first important lesson to be drawn
from CCH. The Court explained that a "sweat of the brow"
approach unduly favours owners' rights and "fails to allow
copyright to protect the public's interest in maximizing the
production and dissemination of intellectual works. 63 It would
seem to follow that, according to the Supreme Court of Canada,
the appropriate copyright balance can only be struck where facts
and information remain in the public domain, free for the taking.' 4
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). 'Protection for the fruits of such
research ... may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair
competition. But to accord copyright protection on this basis alone distorts basic
copyright principles in that it creates a monopoly in public domain materials
without the necessary justification of protecting and encouraging the creation of
'writings' by 'authors"': Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright (New York: Matthew Bender, 1990) at § 3.04.
62 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at para. 22.
63 Ibid. at para. 24.
64 It should be noted that this conclusion is not uncontroversial. From an
instrumentalist perspective, an economic argument may support the grant of
some form of exclusive control over industrious collections of information in
order to incentivize such laborious but socially useful activity. After all,
compilations of information suffer from the same public goods problems as
traditional works of intellectual expression. A utilitarian argument could favour
the grant of some form of control over facts in the name of incentives to engage
in the costly and laborious processes of fact gathering: see e.g. Siebrasse, supra
note 56 at 200: "[l]n general, it is precisely when the facts are expensive to
gather that copyright protection is needed in order to ensure that they are
gathered at all." For an account of the economic theory of copyright more
generally, see e.g. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2003);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law" (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325; Stephen Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs" (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281. Whether or not, or to what extent,
compiled facts may merit some form of protection from an economic utilitarian
perspective is an important question, but one that is largely beyond the scope of
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It will be important for future courts applying the originality
doctrine to informational works to bear this conclusion in mind.
Whatever scope of protection will be afforded to works such as
data compilations pursuant to the "skill and judgment" test, it
should not permit the creation of effectively exclusive rights over
facts. In this sense, the protection given to informational works
must be "thin".65 As the Supreme Court appears to have
understood, this requires a departure from the notion that
copyright is an appropriate reward for cost, trouble, and labour
alone.
B. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT THE MEANING OF "AND" IS
Resisting a pure sweat-based standard is an effective way to limit
the judicial tendency to find infringement whenever information
is extracted from a factual compilation.66 But this does not offer a
this article. For the purposes of my argument here, it is sufficient to note that the
Supreme Court's decision to exclude facts was informed by its understanding of
the public interest at stake in the copyright balance, and the limits of the author's
right to reward.
65 The concept of "thin" copyright protection was explained in Feist, supra
note 6 at 349: "[N]o matter how original the format, however, the facts
themselves do not become original through association .... This inevitably
means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid
copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in
another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the
competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement. As one
commentator explains it: 'No matter how much original authorship the work
displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are free for the taking.... The very same
facts and ideas may be divorced from the context imposed by the author, and
restated or reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the first to
discover the facts or to propose the ideas"': Jane C. Ginsburg, "Creation and
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information" (1990) 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1865 at 1868 [Ginsburg, "Creation and Commercial Value"].)
66 It is at least a shortcut to that end. However, it could be argued that a
sweat-based approach to copyright protection does not necessarily entail
protecting the information included in a protected compilation. For example, one
could avoid this result by drawing a critical distinction between types of labour
invested at different moments in the production process, such that copyright
protects only labour involved in the actual expression of the information
collected. Prior labour involved in producing the compilation--discovering
information and deciding upon which facts to include-would then be beyond
the scope of any resulting copyright interest, leaving room for the lawful
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complete explanation for the "skill and judgment" test. The Court
not only resisted a pure "sweat of the brow" theory, but also
refused what many regard to be the traditional Anglo-Canadian
approach that would require "sweat plus x." As I understand it, the
Court thus rejected the notion that expended labour is relevant to
determining copyright's subsistence. If the ruling does indeed
embrace this broader proposition-that pure labour is simply not
part of the copyright equation-then this has a far greater
theoretical significance than the simple assertion that information
belongs in the public domain.
As such, my aim in this section is to demonstrate that nothing
in the originality jurisprudence demanded the exclusion of labour
as a component of original authorship. Even if the Supreme Court
in CCH rejected "sweat of the brow" in order to ensure the public
nature of information, this is not enough, in itself, to explain the
omission of "labour" from the list of ingredients that make up
originality. Traditionally, "labour" has been said in the same
breath as "skill and judgment", and the resulting threshold has
been at least as high as "skill and judgment" alone. Such a "sweat
plus" threshold would not protect mere sweat, and nor need it
protect facts. The significance of the Court's decision to omit
"labour" from Canada's originality standard therefore becomes
reproduction of the information when expressed in a different form. However,
this distinction between expressive and prior labour becomes difficult to
maintain when we remember that copyright protects the original selection of
information (see Copyright Act, supra note 1, s. 2; Robertson (S.C.C.), supra
note 2.) Furthermore, a similar line of reasoning was rejected as "unsound" by a
majority of the Lords in Ladbroke, supra note 5 at 478. Compare The British
Horseracing Board Ltd. (BHB) v. William Hill Organization, Ltd., C-203/02
2004 E.C.R. (Grand Chamber). A more direct route to challenging the protection
of facts under "sweat of the brow" would be to appeal to the idea-expression
dichotomy: Just as copyright protects not the idea (however original) but only
the author's expression of that idea, it can protect only the expression of facts
and not the facts themselves. Applying the concept of "merger", where a fact can
only be expressed in one or a limited number of ways, copyright should not
protect the particular expression that would confer a right over the information.
We need not rely upon the originality doctrine as the sole sieve in the task of
excluding facts from copyright protection. Whether, doctrinally speaking, the
indirect protection of information is an inevitable consequence of a sweat-based
originality doctrine should be a subject for further discussion. However, case law
and commentary do suggest that this is the likely consequence.
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apparent only when viewed against the backdrop of British
originality jurisprudence, and earlier Canadian cases. The
following discussion of this jurisprudence should reveal that a
"skill, labour, and judgment" test would have been the obvious
choice for a court prepared to concede any role for labour in
determinations of copyrightability.
1. THE BRITISH APPROACH
A common formulation of the originality standard in Britain
requires "skill and labour" or "skill, labour, and judgment".
Applying this test, labour is not the sole basis of the right
conferred: An automatic or mechanical production would not
necessarily be protected if it resulted from industry, but required
nothing in the way of skill or judgment. Both "skill" and
"judgment" import an additional ingredient into copyrightability,
moving the test further along the originality spectrum, away from
pure industry and towards creativity. The "labour" component is
but one apparently necessary ingredient in the mix of attributes
that combine to constitute "originality".
While the United Kingdom is widely regarded as the
archetypal "sweat of the brow" jurisdiction, this is an
oversimplification of the originality doctrine as it emerges from
the British case law.67 Support for the proposition that labour
alone is sufficient may be found in the judgment of Lord Devlin
in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd.: "The
requirement of originality means that the product must originate
from the author in the sense that it is the result of a substantial
degree of skill, industry or experience employed by him."6
Similarly, Lord Evershed in Ladbroke considered whether there
was "skill, labour or judgment" in the work., 69 However, this
position should be contrasted against other authorities from U.K.
67 In fact, "there is no clear authoritative statement that the exercise of
considerable labour is sufficient in itself to confer copyright protection, and that
therefore the sweat of the brow doctrine is part of U.K. copyright law": Davison,
supra note 37 at 143.
68 Ladbroke, supra note 5 at 478, cited in Davison, supra note 37 at 144
[emphasis added].
69 Ladbroke, supra note 5 at 472 [emphasis added].
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jurisprudence that support a formulation of originality requiring
both labour and skill. One example is the case of Football League
Ltd. v. Littlewoods Pools Ltd., in which the court held:
Copyright can only be claimed in the composition or language which
is chosen to express the information or the opinion.... [W]here the
facts are represented in some special way, it then becomes a question
of fact and degree as to whether the skill and labour involved in such
special representation of the information is entitled to copyright.7°
Thus stated, it would seem that copyright in factual compilations
in the United Kingdom does not always or necessarily flow from
labour alone, and that British courts have, at least implicitly,
respected the distinction between facts and their expression.
Indeed, a similar conclusion may be drawn from the older House
of Lords case of Cramp v. Smythson,7 in which the Lords'
conception of original authorship was sufficient to exclude from
copyright pure facts whose expression required nothing
significant in the way of skill or judgment.7 Having inquired into
"[w]hether enough work, labour and skill is involved",73 the
Lords denied protection to a compilation of data, even in the face
of "slavish copying" by a competitor.
A similar standard has taken shape in more recent House of
Lords rulings. In the case of Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell
Williams (Textiles) Ltd.,74 Lord Hoffman understood "originality"
"in the sense of the contribution of the author's skill and
labour";75 Lord Bingham explained that copyright vested in
"anyone who by his or her own skill and labour creates an
original work"; 76 Lord Scott declared it to be an underlying
principle of copyright law that "a copier is not at liberty to
70 2 All E.R. 546 at 651-52, [1959] 1 Ch. 63, cited in Davison, supra note
37 at 144 [emphasis added].
"' 2 All E.R. 92, [1944] A.C. 329 (H.L.). Cf Kelly, supra note 56.
72 Cramp, supra note 71 at 336: According to Lord MacMillan: "The
inclusion or exclusion of one or more of the tables constituting the ordinary
stock material of the diary-compiler seems to me to involve the very minimum
of labour and judgment": ibid. at 338 [emphasis added].
73 Ibid. at 340, Lord Porter [emphasis added].
74 [2001] 1 All E.R. 700, [2000] W.L.R. 2416 (H.L.).
75 Ibid. at para. 27 [emphasis added].
76 Ibid. at para. 2 [emphasis added].
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appropriate the benefit of another's skill and labour."'7 7 In
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Marks & Spencer plc., 78 the
House of Lords found that infringement requires "copying of
sufficient of the relevant skill and labour to constitute a
substantial part of the [protected work]. 79
Even this little dip into British case law reveals the complexity
of a standard that has been reduced in name to a "sweat of the
brow" test, 80 and this, in turn, adds nuance to the common but
overly stark dissection of originality into a sweat or creativity
standard. In fact, it seems that the moment of departure comes
somewhere closer to the middle of the spectrum, somewhere
between "skill, labour, or judgment" and "skill, labour, and
judgment". If this is, indeed, the critical distinction, the degree of
ambiguity presented by the case law cannot be overstated: Many
judgments refer to the need for an author to exercise "skill, labour,
and/or judgment".8 While this may seem like a small concession
to ambiguity, "and/or" collapses the doctrinal polarity, replacing it
with interchangeable but critically opposed versions of original
authorship: When "or" is used, labour is enough; when "and" is
used, something more is required.
77 Ibid. at para. 72 [emphasis added].
78 2001 UKHL 38, [2001] 3 All E.R. 977, [2003] 1 A.C. 551.
79 Ibid. at para. 20, Lord Hoffman [emphasis added]. The infringement
ruling turned upon whether the portion of the work taken by the defendant
qualitatively possessed the attributes that entitled the work to protection. Thus,
the relevant expression for the purposes of determining the scope of the owner's
interest was only "their expression in the original work [that had] involved
sufficient of the relevant original skill and labour to attract copyright
protection": ibid. at para. 20, cited in Daniel Gervais, "Feist Goes Global: A
Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law" (2002) 49
Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 949 at n. 61 and accompanying
text [emphasis added] [Gervais, "Feist Goes Global"].
80 The following may be a more accurate description: "The consensus of
opinion amongst academic writers is that the standard of originality under U.K.
copyright law is either a sweat of the brow standard, or one very close to it in
which sweat of the brow, coupled with a very small amount of creativity, will be
sufficient": Davison, supra note 37 at 144. My own feeling is that the U.K.
position would be best described as coupling sweat of the brow with a small
amount of skill and/or judgment.
8 Ibid. at 143.
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2. "AND/OR" IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
The contours between "and" and "or" have been actively
addressed in Canadian case law, thanks to some judicial
maneuvering by the Federal Court of Appeal in the Tele-Direct
case:
It is true that in many of the cases we have been referred to, the
expression "skill, judgment or labour" has been used to describe the
test to be met by a compilation in order to qualify as original .... It
seems to me, however, that whenever "or" was used instead of "and,"
it was in a conjunctive rather than in a disjunctive way. It is doubtful
that considerable labour combined with a negligible degree of skill
and judgment will be sufficient in most situations to make a
compilation of data original.82
While a convenient route by which to avoid the legal implications
of the "or" list, this assertion was, respectfully, less than
compelling. In its support, Justice DeCary referred to U & R Tax
Services.83 He pointed to Justice Richard's finding that the work
at issue "involved labour, skill and judgment",84 notwithstanding
his conclusion in that case that "[i]ndustriousness ... is enough".85
However, the fact that the work involved all three ingredients
does not support the proposition that all three were required.
Indeed, Justice Richard was very specific on this point: "[L]abour
or time expended is sufficient to entitle copyright protection". 86 It
is also notable that Justice Richard found the authority for a
labour-only standard in a line of cases that used the word "or"
instead of "and". Thus, the need for "labour, skill, time, ingenuity,
selection or mental effort" 87 was cited as an example of a standard
that requires labour alone.
82 Supra note 6 at para. 29 [emphasis added].
83 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
84 Tele-Direct, supra note 6 at para. 29, n. 16, citing U & R Tax, supra note
19 at para. 24.
85 U & R Tax, supra note 19 at para. 22.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., citing Underwriters Survey Bureau Ltd. v. American Home Fire
Assurance Co., [1939] Ex. C.R. 296 at 303, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 89. Richard J. also
cited B.C. Jockey, supra note 15 (discussed in Part IlIl.A, above), and Fox, supra
note 53 at 329: "The general rule of law is that the use of information ... still
possesses copyright if it is the result of labour, skill or judgement, not copied
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Where "and" and "or" are used interchangeably, a test that
would seem to require some additional feature of skill or
judgment or taste is easily reduced to a basic requirement of
industry. An overarching lesson that can be learned from this
jurisprudence is the overwhelming power of the "labour"
component. An originality standard that posits labour as a relevant
consideration seems prone to metamorphose into a standard that
requires nothing more. In this sense, "and" becomes "or". As one
commentator has explained:
Courts [applying the "skill, judgment, and labour" test] have
protected compilations that have displayed marginal skill in their
selection or arrangement, but which have involved considerable
labour or expense. Thus the application of the "skill and labour" test
is a highly flexible one and it may operate as a pretext for protecting
mainly investment.
88
For example, Justice Linden's ruling in CCH at the Federal
Court of Appeal reveals how the use of the "or" formulation of
the test can reduce the standard to one of merely not copying.
Noting that "originality" has been defined using "various
combinations of the terms 'labour', 'judgment', 'skill', 'work',
'industry', 'effort', 'taste', or 'discretion"', Justice Linden opined
that "these are all possible ingredients in the recipe for
originality", but "[t]hese are not, in themselves, prerequisites to
copyright protection".89 If these ingredients are merely indicators
and not attributes of original authorship, none of them is
specifically required in order to obtain copyright, and it is a small
step to assume that none of them needs to be present for copyright
from others, and even though it may be open to others to make their own
composition or compilation from the same source material."
88 See Tanya Aplin, "When are Compilations Original? Telstra Corporation
v. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty. Ltd." (2001) 23 Eur. I.P. Rev. 543 at 546.
Aplin cites the following cases in support of this statement: BBC v. Wireless
League Gazette Publishing Co., [ 1926] Ch. 433; Purefoy Engineering Co. Ltd. v.
Sykes Boxall & Co. Ltd. (1955), 72 R.P.C. 89; Kalamazoo (Aust) pty Ltd v.
Compact Business Systems Pty. Ltd. (1984), 84 F.L.R. 101; T. R. Flanagan
Smash Repairs Pty. Ltd. v. Jones (2000), 48 I.P.R. 19.
89 CCH (F.C.A.), supra note 9 at 255.
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to subsist.9" The "or" formulation thus leaves the court in search
of nothing but independent origination. Without any examination
of the nature of the work when determining copyrightability-
whether in terms of the human, authorial input involved in its
creation, or the benefit it affords to the public-the notion of a
copyright balance disappears. The threshold for protection is
reduced to maximize the possibility of reward until everything
that is "not copied" in its production is protected, while the
consequences of overprotection go unobserved.
Perhaps the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the potential
for confusion or misapplication presented by the inclusion of
"labour" in the "skill, judgment, and labour" test. If "labour" were
allowed to remain in the test, courts could continue to regard
copyright as a reward for labour, and could continue to find
sufficient labour in anything independently produced.
Independent origination, while undoubtedly the touchstone, or the
sine qua non, of originality, is not its totality. By rejecting the
"eviscerated" standard that emerged from the Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court can be understood to have defended the originality
doctrine and its key role in protecting the public interest against
90 In referring to the Tele-Direct court's approval of a conjunctive test,
Linden J. agreed that labour without skill and judgment would not usually be
sufficient to establish originality on the basis that "[i]f one employs labour alone
without any degree of skill or judgment the result will typically be, in essence, a
mere copy and will be unoriginal for that reason": ibid. at 251. He therefore
equates this with the well-founded suggestion that labour in the process of
creating a mere copy will not attract protection. With respect, the equation is
somewhat flawed: That a work was "not copied" or was "independently
produced" was always an essential aspect of originality, even where copyright
protected mere "sweat of the brow". The controversy was whether it was enough
just to not copy, or was there some additional requirement of labour, skill, or
judgment. Linden J.'s test comes down to requiring only not copying: Works that
involved only labour in their production are not necessarily copied and so may
attract protection. The Supreme Court, in contrast, insisted that originality
requires more than merely independent "origination": "'Original"s plain
meaning implies not just that something is not a copy. It includes, if not
creativity per se, at least some sort of intellectual effort. As Professor Gervais
has noted, '[w]hen used to mean simply that the work must originate from the
author, originality is eviscerated of its core meaning. It becomes a synonym of
'originated,' and fails to reflect the ordinary sense of the word': CCH (S. C. C.),
supra note 7 at 353, citing Gervais, "Feist Foes Global", supra note 79 at 961.
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the creeping expansion of intellectual property rights to the
detriment of society.
The "skill and judgment" test should therefore be recognized
as significantly different from the "skill and labour" test currently
employed in the British courts, and as a significant departure from
the "skill, labour, and judgment" test previously found in the
Canadian court. In the United Kingdom, "[t]he role of labour has
not been segregated from the other components of the tests,
namely skill and judgment."9' In Canada, this is precisely what
happened with the Supreme Court's ruling in CCH: "Labour" has
been segregated-and set aside.
It should be acknowledged that the remaining requirements of
independent origination and the exercise of skill and judgment
necessarily involve some degree of intellectual labour. For
example, one must have invested labour in order to possess the
"developed aptitude" or "practised ability" involved in the
exercise of "skill". The fact that intellectual labour will be present
wherever there is "skill and judgment" does not, however, detract
from my claim that pure "labour" is no longer part of the
originality test. Where the test is one of only "skill and judgment",
the author's labour is no more than incidental. It is relevant only
to the extent that it manifests itself in the exercise of "skill and
judgment", while in its own right, labour is neither necessary nor
determinative.
C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF "LABOUR"
In this section, I have attempted to show that the omission of
"labour" from Canada's new originality standard was neither
obvious nor inconsequential, but rather profound and potentially
pivotal in the development of Canadian copyright law. Indeed,
when examined in light of earlier Anglo-Canadian originality
jurisprudence, it seems likely that the industry factor was not just
omitted but deliberately excised. Neither the decision to reject a
pure "sweat of the brow" standard, nor the desire to ensure that
information remains in the public domain, offers a full
explanation for why "labour" was dropped. By excluding "labour"
91 Davison, supra note 37 at 14.
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from the "skill and judgment" test, the Supreme Court effectuated
a subtle but critical departure in Canadian jurisprudence away
from the minimalist formulations of originality that had "shift[ed]
the balance of copyright protection too far in favour of the
owner's rights."92 In my opinion, the first key to understanding
the new standard for originality in Canada is to appreciate the
significance of this departure, and the implicit irrelevance of
"sweat".
Of course, given the powerful, persuasive force of the labour-
reward equation that has subsisted in common law copyright
regimes practically since their inception,93 this will be easier said
than done. There are already indications that that the departure
from a labour-based standard has been overlooked by lower courts
interpreting the decision. In the case of Robertson v. Thomson, 94
the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the requirements for
copyright protection and defined originality with reference to the
CCH ruling:
The definition of original work chosen by the Supreme Court has
both a labour component and a content component. This approach
falls between U.K. law, which extends copyright to cover any work
produced through one's labour, and U.S. law, which requires an
element of creativity for copyright to apply (a relatively higher
standard than the requirement ofjudgment).
95
92 CCH (S.CC.), supra note 7 at 356.
93 The Lockean notion that a person has property in the fruits of his labour
was extended into the literary realm and propounded in the literary property
debates of 18th century Britain. In the case of Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R. 201
(1769), (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, it was held that the author did indeed have a natural
right to the fruits of his intellectual labour, justified by Lord Mansfield in
Lockean terms, at 252: "[A]n author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own
ingenuity and labour." Although this decision was a short-lived precedent, being
overruled five years later in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 E.R. 257
(1774), 1 E.R. 837, L. Ray Patterson has argued persuasively that the Millar
judgment and the controversy that surrounded it "firmly fixed the idea of
copyright as an author's right": L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical
Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) at 15.
94 (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 481, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Ont. C.A.) [Robertston
(C.A.) cited to O.R.].
95 Ibid. at 493, Weiler J.A. [emphasis added].
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Because the Supreme Court cast the "skill and judgment" test
as a middle ground between sweat and creativity, "labour" was no
sooner removed than it was allowed to creep back in as a facet of
the Court's compromise. Even if we accept that the new standard
can be appropriately conceived as a compromise position between
two extremes, 96 part of the compromise apparently involved
removing an independent "labour" component from the originality
doctrine. Unless the doctrinal and political import of this is
recognized, there is a risk that the potential of the CCH ruling will
go unrealized.
It is no coincidence that the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Robertson was expressly guided by conviction that "to deprive
authors of the fruits of their labour is unjust." 97 I have suggested
that the Supreme Court's stand against a "sweat" or "sweat plus"
originality test essentially repudiates the theory that copyright is a
reward for labour. According to the Chief Justice, when copyright
protects works that require only labour in their production, it risks
"overcompensating" the author. 98 It can be inferred that rewarding
pure labour with a copyright interest gives reward where reward is
not due. Following this logic, copyright is not a reward for labour,
but for something more. As a reward, it is deserved only when an
author exercises skill and judgment in the creation of "works of
the arts and intellect". 99 This could be conceptualized as the quid
pro quo that society receives in return for granting the author's
right. 100
96 As I discuss further below (see Part V, below), doubt could be cast upon
this characterization of the "skill and judgment" test if it is closer to the U.S.
creativity standard than the Supreme Court suggested.
97 Supra note 94 at 496.
98 CCH (S.CC.), supra note 7 at 355-56.
99 Ibid. This refers to the Supreme Court's ruling in Thtberge v. Galerie
D'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. 2002 SCC 34, [2002] S.C.R. 336 at 355, 210
D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Th~berge cited to S.C.R.].
100 In this way, the Supreme Court's interpretation of originality in CCH
can shed light upon its conception of copyright's purposes as previously
articulated in Thbberge, ibid. at 355: "a balance between promoting the public
interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect
and obtaining a just reward for the creator." Of course, the notion of authors'
"just reward" is compatible with a commitment to authors' natural rights (see
Craig, "Locke", supra note 42 at 19). However, whether a reward is "just"
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The Supreme Court's ruling in CCH eludes the philosophical
and practical implications of a sweat-based approach to
originality. Philosophically, awarding copyright to works that
involved mere "sweat of the brow" may appear to endorse a
"natural rights or Lockean theory of 'just desserts', namely that an
author deserves to have his or her efforts in producing a work
rewarded."'" 1 Practically, granting copyright to such works may
permit the "improper extension of copyright over facts"'' 0 2 and
thereby diminish the public domain. By rejecting "sweat of the
brow", and by dropping "labour" from the components that
constitute originality, the Supreme Court's decision could
represent a significant step for Canadian copyright policy: a step
away from labour and the author's claim of right; away from the
expansion of copyright's scope and the diminishment of the
information commons; and towards the public interest, the public
domain, and the purposive interpretation of copyright doctrine.
IV. WHAT HAPPENED TO "CREATIVITY"?
If the Supreme Court's ruling on originality in CCH is understood
in this way, the pure industry of the author should no longer have
a part to play in subsistence determinations. However, having
rejected the relevance of authorial "sweat" in terms not dissimilar
to those of the U.S. Supreme Court in Feist, the Court also
explicitly eschewed any need for creativity in the originality
depends upon the nature of the action that is thought to deserve reward. Because
the Supreme Court refuses to recognize mere labour as deserving of copyright,
we can conclude that copyright is not "just reward" for labour.
l01 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 351-52. It seems clear from this statement
that the Court intended to reject a sweat-based standard that it understood to be
premised on the logic of a natural rights theory of labour. It should be noted that
a "sweat of the brow" doctrine could also find support from an economic
utilitarian perspective: see supra note 64. I have argued elsewhere, however, that
there is an easy slippage from an economically rationalized interest in the
product of one's labour to a morally deserved right therein: A "reward" is readily
regarded as something that is "deserved", and that which is "deserved" comes to
be regarded as an "entitlement": see Craig, "Locke", supra note 42 at 15. See
also Jeremy Waldron, "From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property" (1992-1993) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 841 at
851-52.
102 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 355.
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requirement.'° 3 The Supreme Court of Canada agreed in principle
that originality required more than merely independent production
or the investment of pure labour; the Court aimed to avoid
indirectly extending protection to information; and the Court
appears to have decided that the "skill, labour, and judgment" test
presents too many potential problems. So the question remains:
Why not adopt the ready-made solution offered by its U.S.
counterpart in the form of the creativity standard?
The discussion that follows considers the arguments for
resisting a creativity standard from the perspective of the Court's
stated reasons and the other possible motivations at play. Once
again, in order to fully comprehend the significance of the Court's
refusal to follow Feist, we will have to look beyond the Court's
explicit rationale and try to identify the philosophical, political,
and pragmatic considerations that may have guided the Court's
analysis. I will suggest that the Court's choice to avoid the term
"creativity" should have a bearing upon the future interpretation
and application of the "skill and judgment" test. I will look first to
the role and theoretical significance of "creativity" in the civil law
tradition. I will argue that a further key to understanding "skill
and judgment" is to acknowledge a deliberate departure from
civilian conceptions of the author's natural rights.
A. THE CONNOTATIONS OF "CREATIVITY"
It is clear that in arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the need to ensure that additional requirements
were not imported into the originality doctrine that may involve
substantive assessment of the quality, merit, or novelty of
copyrightable works. Chief Justice McLachlin dismissed a
creativity requirement ostensibly on the basis that:
A creativity standard implies that something must be novel or non-
obvious-concepts more properly associated with patent law than
copyright law. By way of contrast, a standard requiring the exercise
103 "O'Connor J.'s concerns [in Feist, supra note 6 at 345, 358] about the
,sweat of the brow' doctrine's improper extension of copyright over facts also
resonate in Canada. I would not, however, go as far as O'Connor J. in requiring
that a work possess a minimal degree of creativity to be considered original":
ibid.
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of skill and judgment in the production of a work avoids these
104difficulties ....
Were novelty a requirement, copyright would protect only those
works that, in some sense, departed from or improved upon the
existing body of intellectual creations. It is axiomatic that
copyright does not compare a work to others to determine
eligibility, but inquires only into the personal processes of
authorship. As the Chief Justice notes, objective novelty belongs
to the realm of patent law, wherein independent production
without copying is no defence to infringement, never mind a basis
upon which to assert a separate and equal entitlement. According
to the Court's reasons, then, this is cause enough to resist any
terminology that connotes a standard of objective novelty.
It seems fair and relatively uncontroversial that the Court
would wish to avoid implications of novelty.0 5 However, in Feist,
Chief Justice O'Connor explicitly made clear that "creativity"
implied no such thing:
Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is
fortuitous, not the result of copying. To illustrate, assume that two
poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. Neither
work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable. 
106
As such, "[t]he Court's suggestion that the Feist creativity
standard implies novelty is clearly mistaken."'0 7 "Creativity", in
104 CCH(S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 356.
105 See Thomas Dreier & Gunnar Kamell, "Originality of the Copyrighted
Work: A European Perspective" (1992) 39 Journal of the Copyright Society of
the U.S.A. 289 at 290: "We have found, in the literature on copyright, hesitation
about the use of a novelty concept. Such hesitation is of course due to novelty
being an absolute requirement for patent protection and for protectability of
other forms of industrial property.... [N]ovelty has acquired a distinct meaning
in intellectual property language. It may, therefore, not seem advisable to dilute
it or give it a particular additional copyright meaning."
106 Supra note 6 at 345-46. In support of the originality of identical but
independent creations, the Court cited Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49 at 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
107 Abraham Drassinower, "Sweat of the Brow, Creativity, and Authorship:
On Originality in Canadian Copyright Law" (2003-2004) 1 University of Ottawa
Law & Technology Journal 107 at 123, n. 57. See also Daniel J. Gervais,
"Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCI" (2004) 18 I.P.J. 131 at 139 [Gervais,
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copyright terms, does not demand an assessment of the inherent
characteristics of the work, but speaks only to the processes of its
creation. The dispositive criteria are internal to the workings of
the author's mind. °8 The question is not one of objective
newness-whereby a work differs to a specified degree from
other, pre-existing works-but rather with subjective newness:
The work is "new" to the person who brought it into being, in the
sense that it was not copied, but was independently produced:
What is not new from a strict point of view (absolute novelty) can be
seen as subjectively new and thereby worthy of copyright, if only the
person who brought the item into being did not know of any such
earlier item or set of elements to which the relevant criteria can
apply.' 09
If the Court was afraid of a judicial inclination to misunderstand
or misapply a creativity standard, it could easily have elaborated
on the meaning of "creativity". The U.S. Supreme Court gave a
clear statement to the effect that creativity was not novelty, and
the Canadian Supreme Court could have done the same.
The rejection of external considerations, such as literary
merit"10 or objective novelty, is fairly fundamental in the common
"Post-CCF']: "Whence does the Court draw the conclusion that creativity is
equivalent to novelty or non-obviousness? These notions, which belong to patent
law, are not used, to my knowledge, either in Feist or in relevant decisions in
civil-law jurisdictions." Teresa Scassa similarly criticizes the Court's reasoning:
"[T]his critique [of the creativity standard] is overstated. While it might be true
of a standard of 'creativity' simpliciter, it is much less true of a standard that
requires only a 'minimal level' or 'spark' of creativity. In practical terms, a
'spark' of creativity may be very little indeed." See Teressa Scassa,
"Recalibrating Copyright Law? A Comment on the Supreme Court of Canada's
Decision in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada"
(2004) 3 C.J.L.T. 89 at 90-91, online: CJLT <http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol3_no2/
pdfarticles/scassa.pdf> [Scassa, "Recalibrating Copyright Law?"].
108 See Ryan Littrel, "Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright
Law" (2001) 43 B.C.L. Rev. 193 at 201: "[T]he author's personal contribution,
rather than the work itself, is the dispositive criterion." The criteria of originality
are therefore internal, in the sense that they "inhere in the person who creates the
work": Dreier & Kamell, supra note 105 at 290-91.
109 Supra note 105 at 290 [emphasis omitted].
110 The creativity standard is sometimes criticized for its potential to imply
the need for subjective judgments of the quality or merit of a work. However,
"creativity" in copyright terminology should not be attributed the same meaning
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law tradition, and does not offer much assistance in terms of
defining what originality is, as opposed to what it is not.
Meanwhile, nothing in the Supreme Court's critique would seem
to undermine a creativity standard properly understood and
correctly applied. Therefore, the Court's reasoning falls short of
an emphatic repudiation of the principles that underlie a Feist-like
creativity standard. My suggestion is that the court chose to resist
the language of "creativity", rather than the practical test itself,
perhaps because its adoption of that language would have wider
philosophical and political implications.
B. "CREATIVITY" AND THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
1. THE CIVIL/COMMON LAW DYNAMIC IN CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
While the connection has been superficially muddied somewhat
by the adoption of a creativity approach in the United States, there
is a clear relationship between an elevated originality threshold
requiring something in the way of creativity, and the civilian
copyright tradition. In France, for example, the standard of
originality is relatively high and demands that the works to which
copyright extends are "intellectual creations" or "works of the
mind". 1 1' The traditional understanding of this terminology was
that it possesses in the arts. As opposed to signifying inventiveness or
imagination that would require some understanding and evaluation of these
attributes as they are manifested in a work, it means only that the author has
made some choices as to selection or arrangement of the work that were
independently arrived at, and which entailed some minimal amount of creativity.
Whether a work has merit or is of a certain quality is a decision that is not
required to establish whether a work is "creative" in the sense intended by
O'Connor J. in Feist, supra note 6 at 345: "To be sure, the requisite level of
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority
of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no
matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be. (Nimmer § 1.08 [C] [1].)"
"' Art. Ll12-3 C.I.P. (1992), online: Legifrance <http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/cpialtext.htm> on the protection of anthologies or
collections of miscellaneous works or data. Pursuant to Art. L 112-1, the C.I.P.
protects the rights of authors in "all works of the mind". The French courts have
established a threshold for protection by requiring that the author show his or her
personality in the work, which at a minimum would require some intellectually
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that copyrightability required the imprint of the personality of the
author upon the work, which, in the modem context of computer
programs and data compilations, has been interpreted to mean
something akin to intellectual input or creative choice. 12 The
search for originality is thus the search for the mark of the
author's individuality as revealed in his or her expression:
"[E]xpressive self-articulation" 3 - the heart of true authorship--
is achieved through the creative imagination. While such an
approach imposes a more onerous standard for obtaining
copyright than the traditional industriousness approach of the
common law tradition, once the label of original authorship is
awarded, it comports with a strong authors-rights theory of
copyright, rooted in the notion of possessive personality.'
14
Influenced by continental philosophy, the droit d'auteur that
flows from original, creative authorship emanates from the
"inalienable personality of the author."' 
5
creative choice: see Daniel Gervais, La Notion d'Oeuvre Dans La Convention de
Berne et en Droit Compare (Gen~ve, France: Librarie Droz, 1998) at 85-86.
112 See Andr6 Lucas & Robert Plaisant, "France" in Melville B. Nimmer &
Paul E. Geller, eds., International Copyright Law and Practice (New York:
Matthew Bender, 1999) at 4, cited in Davison, supra note 37 at 114. See also
Gervais, "Feist Goes Global", supra note 79 at 968-70.
113 Charles Taylor describes "this new power of expressive self-
articulation" and its role in the Romantic period and definitions of the modem
self in Sources of the Self The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1989) at 389-90.
114 See Ginsburg, "Creation and Commercial Value", supra note 65 at
1881-88, discussing personality, individuality, and authorship. As Ginsburg
explains: "Logically, the property-in-personality notion can be extended ... to
the literary property right, which controls published manifestations of oneself as
revealed in one's writings. The self-revelatory character of literary creation
justifies the creator's assertion of private property rights in the work when
published as well as in the work before it is disclosed": (ibid. at 1884). See also
Jane C. Ginsburg, "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America" (1990) 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991.
115 Thomas Dreier, "Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests:
Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?" in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane
Leenheer Zimmerman, & Harry First, eds., Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001) at 298. The passage in full reads: "Somewhat
simplified, it may be said that the Anglo-American system ... has retained much
of its initial character as a limited monopoly, expressly granted in order to serve
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The divergence between civilian and common law principles
of authorial right has a particularly critical relevance in Canadian
copyright jurisprudence. Although the federal Act ostensibly
follows the British tradition and philosophy, Canadian case law
and commentary manifests some degree of tension between
Canada's two major legal systems. As was noted by Justice
Binnie, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court Justices in the
Th~berge decision," 6 the English and French versions of the
Canadian Copyright Act use the terms "droit d'auteur" and
"copyright" as though they were direct translations and equivalent
terms, while, in fact, they are widely thought to encapsulate very
different conceptions of the copyright interest:
[T]he distinction between the copyright tradition and the "droit
d'auteur" tradition is based on a question of terminology: where the
followers of the first tradition, the British and their spiritual heirs,
talk about "copyright" to refer to a right that derives from the
existence of a "copy," an object in itself, the followers of the second
tradition talk about "author's right" to refer to a right that stems from
intellectual effort or activity brought to bear by an author, a
creator. 117
Whereas Justice Binnie was intent upon avoiding the
confusion that led others to import civiliste concepts into
Canadian copyright, the minority ruling reached by the three
judges from Quebec insisted that "it is important to recall that
Canadian copyright law derives from multiple sources and draws
the public interest. In contrast, the continental system ... has developed in the
course of the nineteenth century under the influence of German idealistic
philosophy and French legal doctrine, from a mere printer's and publisher's right
into a right based on natural justice, a right that is now understood as emanating
from the inalienable personality of the author" [footnote omitted]. For a detailed
comparison between the common law and continental perspective, see Alain
Strowel, "Droit D'Auteur and Copyright: Between History and Nature" in Brad
Sherman & Alain Strowel, eds., Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 235 et seq.
116 Supra note 99 at 367.
117 Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur et copyright-Divergences et
convergences: tude de droit compar6 (Paris: Librairie grnrrale de droit et de
jurisprudence, 1993) at 19-20, cited in Thberge, supra note 99 at 367.
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on both common law tradition and continental civil law
concepts."" 1
8
In support of this position, Justice Gonthier quoted the
following passage:
Canadian law inherited [the common law copy-right] aspect while
remaining receptive to the French doctrines, particularly because of
Quebec's influence. This does great credit to our law since the
Canadian Parliament is more inclined than any other legislature to
stay attuned to external developments in order to mould its own
rules. 119
2. THE CIVIL/COMMON LAW DYNAMIC IN CANADA'S
ORIGINALITY DOCTRINE
The continuing pervasiveness of civiliste conceptions of the droit
d'auteur in Canadian copyright may have had a bearing upon the
Court's chosen formulation of an "original authorship" standard. I
would suggest that the use of the term "creativity" in this bi-
juridical setting would present greater challenges in Canada than
in the Anglo-American context. For one thing, due to the
correspondence between a creativity standard and a personality-
based conception of the copyright interest, it might be thought that
the former affirms the latter, such that the originality doctrine
determines the nature of the right that is conferred. In other words,
if we adopt a creativity test that appears to demand the reflection
of the author's personality in the work, then the resultant right
will be understood to flow from that investment of personality.
Within this context, the creativity test could fortify a
conceptualization of copyright as an inalienable authorial right,
which would have significant implications in terms of defining the
form, scope, and limit of the right.
118 Thberge, ibid. at 386, Gonthier J., with L'Heureux Dub and LeBel JJ.
concurring.
119 Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, "La nature du droit d'auteur: droit de propri~t6
ou monopole?" 43 McGill L. J. 507 (1998) at 562, cited in Thberge, supra note
99 at 388 [translated by Gonthier J.].
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"Creativity", as it exists in the United States, does, of course,
come with its own ideological baggage.' However, the
personality theory underlying the civilian tradition places the
romantic author-figure front and centre as the individual around
whom the copyright system is built, and in whose interest it
operates. The power of this philosophy is apparent in the Tele-
Direct ruling at the Federal Court of Appeal. Endorsing a Feist-
like approach to originality, the requirement of creativity was
asserted, not as the basis for furthering the copyright balance or
the interests of the public, but rather as a means of identifying the
true and deserving "author":
One should always keep in mind that one of the purposes of the
copyright legislation, historically, has been "to protect and reward
the intellectual effort of the author ... in the work." The use of the
word "copyright" in the English version of the Act has obscured that
fact that what the Act fundamentally seeks to protect is "le droit
d'auteur." While not defined in the Act, the word "author" conveys a
sense of creativity and ingenuity. 121
In CCH, Justice Gibson of the Trial Division quoted this
passage as support for his application of the creativity standard,
120 There is a great deal of interesting scholarship that critiques the
pervasiveness of romantic authorship tropes as they are revealed through the
notion of original, creative authorship: see e.g. James Boyle, Shamans, Software,
and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1996), in which Boyle argues that misguided and
misplaced attachment to notions of "romantic authorship" underlie the general
expansion of the intellectual property regime. But see Mark Lemley, "Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property" (1997) 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, taking
issue with relevance of "romantic authorship" in this regard. See also Jessica
Litman, "The Public Domain" (1990) 39 Emory L.J. 965; Peter Jaszi, "Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship' (1991) Duke L.J.
455; Peter Jaszi, "On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity" (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 293; James Boyle, "A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading"
(1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1415; Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., The
Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994).
121 Tele-Direct, supra note 6 at para. 15. See also CCH (F.C.A.), supra note
9 at 284-85. Tele-Direct endorsed the requirement of creativity not as the basis
for furthering the public interest, but rather as a means of identifying the
deserving "author": Craig, "Evolution of Originality", supra note 17 at 432.
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thereby revealing that the creativity approach seemingly drawn
from the U.S. jurisprudence was, in the Canadian context,
welcomed as the validation of a civilian philosophy of original
authorship. The U.S. creativity approach was framed by the
constitutional requirements of promoting "Progress of the useful
Arts" and the public interest in free exchange of ideas and
information. 122 It was explained in light of the "public-oriented
justification of copyright in American law", and depended upon a
"conviction that the requirement of creativity was the correct and
desired way to implement copyright's policy of encouragement,
and thus achieve the optimal result for promoting the public
interest."' 123 The same standard in Canada was framed as an
affirmation of the droit d'auteur. Abraham Drassinower has
addressed this discrepancy:
Justice Decary evoked the inherent dignity of authorial right as the
central copyright concern par excellence, yet he did so by invoking a
case, Feist, that affirms a radically instrumentalist understanding of
the creativity requirement, an understanding for which the author is
but a "secondary" consideration .... The evocations of authorial
dignity obviously involved in the phrase, "le droit d'auteur", have
little to do with the pure public interest instrumentalism of the
American approach that Justice Decary went on to invoke
immediately thereafter. 124
Had the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a creativity
standard for originality, it would be susceptible to interpretation
as the triumph of the civilian concept of the author's right over the
common law conception of copyright as an instrument to facilitate
commercial exploitation. Understood in this light, a creativity
standard would likely entail both the strengthening of copyright
holders' rights, and the increasing elevation of copyright's
threshold to admit only works that display "creativity and
122 In Feist, the refusal to protect facts in a compilation was neither "unfair
nor unfortunate" for the compiler, but was the very means by which copyright
advanced its "primary objective", which is not to reward authors but to promote
progress: see Feist, supra note 6 at 349-50 [emphasis added].
123 Guy Pessach, "The Legacy of Feist Revisited-A Critical Analysis of
the Creativity Requirement" (2002) 36 Isr. L.R. 19 at 43 [citation omitted].
124 Drassinower, supra note 107 at 117-18.
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ingenuity", and bear the imprint of the author's personality.
Apparently, the Court felt that neither result would further "a
balance between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator." '25
C. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON DECLINING "CREATIVITY"
To summarize, the primary difficulty posed by a "creativity"
standard in Canada is the philosophical assumptions that the term
entails. The concept of authorial creativity could not easily be
recast as an instrumental requirement, whose purpose was to
further the goals of the copyright system. By the same token, if a
creativity requirement were imported into such a setting, it would
be hard to cast the author's right as anything other than a natural
entitlement flowing from the investment of his or her personality
in the work. Taking into account the rather unique dynamics of
Canadian copyright law, the creativity standard, while justified in
the United States in terms of copyright's incentive structure, has
the potential in Canada to exacerbate a critical doctrinal division,
to emerge as a full-blown personality-based standard, and to
substantiate a philosophical conception of authorship, ill-suited to
the common law context and the purposes of copyright identified
by the Court.
In my opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada took up the
challenge of formulating a standard that would cohere reasonably
well with the creativity standard, 12 6 embrace competing visions of
authorship, but evade these potentialities. The key to formulating
such a test was to omit the word "creativity". The key to
understanding the test is, therefore, to recognize the significance
of this omission and what it implies about Canada's new standard:
With the exclusion of "creativity"-as with the exclusion of
"labour"--the Court deliberately resisted a formulation of
originality that would define it in terms of the author's individual
125 Thdberge, supra note 99, cited in CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 349. It
ought to be inferred that copyright is not regarded by the Supreme Court as a
"just reward" for the author's investment of personality in her work. Cf Craig,
"Locke", supra note 100.
126 See Section V, below.
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investment and corresponding entitlement. In doing so, it took
another step away from rights-based and author-oriented
determinants of copyrightability, and towards an instrumental
interpretation of copyright's reach.
V. WHAT REMAINS? THE [NSTRUMENTALITY OF
ORIGINALITY
I have argued that the Supreme Court's decision to exclude both
"labour" and "creativity" from its originality test suggests a
willingness to expunge from the originality doctrine labour-
reward and personality theories of right, both of which have
influenced the doctrine's (mis)application in the Canadian courts.
This conclusion still leaves open the question of how the new
standard should be understood in the absence of such theories.
The answer, I suggest, lies in the reconceptualization of
originality in an instrumental mode: It is not the foundation of an
individual entitlement, but a legal tool with which to further a
social end. In order to make this case, I will briefly turn our
attention back to the U.S. position.
A. THE U.S. ORIGINALITY STANDARD COMPARED
Notwithstanding the common conflation of creativity and civil
law theory in Canada, the American creativity approach is not
tantamount to the "intellectual creation" standard invoked by
Justice DeCary in Tele-Direct.127 Describing the U.S. originality
standard that emerged from Feist, David Freedman has warned:
The creativity standard [in the United States] is not akin to the
"author's own intellectual creation" standard in those civilian
systems in which the personality of the author must be reflected in
127 Gibson J. quoted the following passage from Tele-Direct: "Clearly, what
the parties to the [NAFTA] [a]greement wanted to protect were compilations of
data that ... constitute 'intellectual creations'. The use of these last two words is
most revealing: compilations of data are to be measured by standards of intellect
and creativity. As these standards were already present in Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence ... I can only assume that the Canadian government in signing the
Agreement ... expected the Court to follow the 'creativity' school of cases rather
that the 'industrious collection' school": CCH (F.C.TD.), supra note 17 at 470,
citing Tele-Direct, supra note 6 at para. 15.
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
the work, but furthers the same policy goals that are familiar to
British copyright: rewarding the judgement and taste of the author
through the copyright grant, encouraging others to act likewise, but
in no case making unavailable the general ideas or discrete matters of
fact that ought to be available to them. 
28
It can be argued that the Feist standard, which requires only a
minimal degree of creativity, does not in fact go much-if any-
further than the Canadian Supreme Court's "skill and judgment"
test, and properly understood, does not raise the bar "too high"
when compared with the traditional standards employed in the
United Kingdom and Canada. 12 9 Such a conclusion would
reinforce the idea that the Court had other reasons for refusing to
follow Feist, and could thereby provide some additional insight
into the newly-formulated test.
In practice, a U.S. standard requiring creativity may be less
exclusionary than it appears on its face, given the kinds of works
that it has proved capable of embracing. For example, in Key
Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,130 a
telephone directory listing businesses associated with New York
City's Chinese-American community was protected by
copyright. '' An interesting comparison can be made between the
Key Publications case and that of ITAL-Press Ltd. v. Sicoli 32 in
the post-Tele-Direct Canadian context, where the court found
copyright in a telephone directory that consisted only of
Canadians of Italian origin."3 Generally, courts applying a
128 Freedman, supra note 14 at 591.
129 The Chief Justice said, in setting out her "skill and judgment" test that
she "would not, however, go as far as O'Connor J. in requiring that a work
possess a minimal degree of creativity . CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 355.
She went on to say that "the creativity standard of originality is too high": ibid.
at 356.
130 945 F.2d 509, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122 (2d Cir. 1991).
131 Decisions to include some uncommon categories or to exclude some
non-viable businesses could amount to creative choices sufficient to confer
copyright in the selection and arrangement of the directory.
132 (1999), 170 F.T.R. 66, 86 C.P.R. (3d) 129 (F.C.T.D.).
133 Gibson J. was satisfied that the selection process meant that this was not
a "garden-variety" directory: ibid. at para. 108. While Gibson J. referred to Feist
and Tele-Direct, it is arguable that he either failed to apply them, or applied them
incorrectly, as the selection apparently involved little more than a technical
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creativity standard have not struggled to find a modicum of
creativity even in highly functional or mundane works. 134 Indeed,
it seems likely that the kind of works that would be excluded by a
"minimum degree of creativity" threshold will fall similarly short
of the "more than trivial skill and judgment" requirement. 1
35
I submit that there is little, if any, likelihood that a "skill and
judgment" test will extend protection to a work that would fail to
satisfy the U.S. creativity test, properly applied. 36 One may
function: see Gervais, "Feist Goes Global", supra note 79 at 964. However, the
point here is that it takes very little for a work to be more than the mere garden-
variety compilation denied copyright in the Feist case.
134 A commonly cited example is that of CCC Information Services, Inc. v.
Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. refused, 516 U.S. 817 (1995), in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found copyright to subsist in a work documenting the value of
different makes and models of cars in the resale market. Again, a parallel can be
drawn with a Canadian case applying a creativity standard: Edutile Inc. v.
Automobile Protection Assn., [2000] 4 F.C. 195, (2000) 6 C.P.R (4th) 211
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2001] 1 F.C. I (S.C.C.). In Edutile, the Court
confirmed and applied its ruling in Tele-Direct, but nonetheless found that
copyright did attach to a price guide for used cars, in which the information was
set out in three columns as opposed to the common dual-column format.
135 Thus, for example, the Second Circuit Court, affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court, refused to find copyright in the pagination and editing provided
by Westlaw in its published court reports on the following basis: "In light of
accepted legal conventions and other external constraining factors, West's
choices on selection and arrangement can reasonably be viewed as obvious,
typical, and lacking even minimal creativity": Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 674 at 677, 44 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1560 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. refused, S. Ct. 526 U.S. 1154 (1999). Similarly, in CCH the Supreme Court
of Canada denied protection to edited judicial reasons, stating: "The changes
made to judicial reasons are relatively trivial .... Any skill and judgment that
might be involved in making these minor changes and additions to the judicial
reasons are too trivial to warrant copyright protection. The changes and additions
are more properly characterized as a mere mechanical exercise": CCH (S.C.C.),
supra note 7 at 360.
136 Gervais has also argued that "the Supreme Court chose a 'middle path'
only in appearance. In fact, Canada has taken on a standard essentially identical
to that of our American neighbours and to the Continental systems": Gervais,
"Post-CCH", supra note 107 at 139. He goes on to describe the "skill and
judgment" test as "functionally indistinguishable from the modicum of creativity
test explicated in Feist": ibid. at 167. See also Scassa, "Recalibrating Copyright
Law?", supra note 107 at 91: "[l]t is difficult to see how, in terms of practical
effect, a non-trivial exercise of skill and judgment will amount to anything other
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assume that a "creativity" standard would leave less room for the
protection of data compilations on the Feistian logic that factual
compilations provide little scope for the exercise of one's creative
faculties, but may nonetheless call upon one's skill or
judgment.' However, both tests are premised upon-and so
must respect-the proposition that "facts ... are free for the
taking."' 38 Equally, both tests demand that the selection or
arrangement of information is the result of more than merely
mechanical or routine choice. 139 The minimal degree of creativity
required in the United States is just enough to reveal some degree
of authorial judgment or choice between possible alternatives that
is not routine, commonplace, mechanical, or dictated by
functional considerations. Arguably, it demands nothing more
than did Chief Justice McLachlin in her description of "skill and
judgment". If this is accepted, then the "creativity" test is not, in
application at least, any "higher" a threshold than the "skill and
judgment" test, despite the Supreme Court's statements to that
effect." 0 It seems fair to say that "the Court can differentiate its
than a "spark" of creativity." Cf Daniel Gervais & Elizabeth F. Judge,
Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005)
at 129.
137 See Scassa, "Recalibrating Copyright Law?", supra note 107 at 91: "It is
arguable that the Canadian standard is more oriented towards utilitarian works
than is the U.S. standard.... [A]ssessing the 'intellectual effort' in the form of
skill and judgment that goes into the works makes more sense than
conceptualizing this effort as a 'spark' of creativity. It is arguable that the U.S.
language of 'creativity,' even if what is required is minimal, could place
utilitarian works at a disadvantage in assessing their worthiness for copyright
protection." However, Scassa goes on to note: "[T]he reality in the United States
is that utilitarian works have been protected using the Feist standard", ibid. The
difference between the standards may therefore be no more than semantic.
138 Feist, supra note 6 at 349, citing Ginsburg, "Creation and Commercial
Value", supra note 64 at 1865, 1868. See also CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at
354-55, endorsing O'Connor J.'s position that facts and information belong in
the public domain.
139 Feist, supra note 6 at 361-62; CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 352.
140 Indeed, one could imagine a work exhibiting creativity, but falling short
of displaying skill and judgment, thus defined. For example, the spontaneous
scribbling of a young child might be wholly, even archetypically, creative, while
demonstrating little or none of the skill or judgment required by the CCH
standard. Also, accidental or inadvertent variations might be caught by a
creativity test (see e.g. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
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own 'skill and judgment' standard from the 'creativity' standard
only by mischaracterizing the latter as requiring something
'novel', 'unique', or 'non-obvious."""' Avoiding such
mischaracterization, the difference between the standards is
elusive-or, perhaps, illusive.
B. WHY DISTINGUISH FEIsT? THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
PERSUASIVENESS
If the creativity test as formulated in the Feist case does not
necessarily go too far, or impose a barrier that is too high, it seems
reasonable to suggest that something more was at play in the
Supreme Court's decision to avoid use of the term "creativity". As
well as the philosophical entailments of the term addressed in the
previous section, the Court's refusal to follow Feist may reflect a
general reluctance to incorporate into Canadian copyright doctrine
what has come to be recognized as an essentially American
standard. In Canadian cases, warnings against the adoption of
American principles abound, usually with reference to the words
of Justice Estey in Compo v. Blue Crest:
United States Courts decisions, even where the factual situations are
similar, must be scrutinized very carefully because of some
fundamental differences in copyright concepts which have been
adopted in the legislation of that country. 1
42
It is common to see this wariness of U.S. precedent justified in
terms of the constitutional basis for the American copyright
system, as though the context and stated purpose of copyright law
in the United States definitively sets it apart from the Canadian
system. 43 Furthermore, the suggestion of misguided reliance
90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153 (2d Cir. 1951)), but fall short of a "skill and judgment"
standard because there is no use of knowledge, aptitude or practiced ability in
such an unintentional variation, nor is there discernment or evaluation of
possible alternatives. See also Scassa, "Recalibrating Copyright Law?", supra
note 107 at 91. While McLachlin C.J.C. claimed that the Canadian test did not
"go as far" as O'Connor J.'s, it may be that the reverse is true.
141 Drassinower, supra note 107 at 123, n. 57.
142 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357 at 367, [1980] 10 D.L.R. (3d) 249.
143 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 reads: "Congress shall have the power ... to
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
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upon American authorities appears to be a popular and effective
ground for appeal. For example, when Justice Linden reversed
Justice Gibson's earlier ruling in CCH, he criticized the trial judge
for having "mistakenly adopted" the American approach and
having "import[ed]" an "American principle" into Canadian law,
thereby exemplifying the wisdom of Justice Estey's warning.1
44
Similar arguments have been given weight in other Canadian
cases.
When exploring the Supreme Court of Canada's decision to
avoid the language of "creativity", it may be wise to keep this
dynamic in mind. Refusing to go as far as Feist, the Supreme
Court cited Compo and observed: "U.S. copyright cases may not
and Discoveries." No equivalent statement exists in Canadian law (which is not
to say that no equivalent purpose exists). Because of this perceived difference
between the systems, Canadian courts have warned that "American case law
must be carefully scrutinized": CCH (F. C. T.D.), supra note 7 at 465, Gibson J.,
and have described U.S. law as "most fascinating from both a cultural and legal
perspective" but "not ... persuasive authority in the context of Canada's
particular copyright regime": Cie gentrale des &ablissements Michelin-
Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada, [1997] 2 F.C. 306, (1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d)
348 (T.D.), Teitelbaum J.
144 CCH(F.C.A), supra note 9 at 242, 259.
145 See e.g. Delrina, supra note 28, where the appellants argued that the trial
judge erred by applying United States authorities on the copyrightability of
computer programs without regard to the significant differences between the
countries' copyright laws. The argument was not successful, but apparently this
was because the appeal court was unconvinced that the trial judge had
necessarily applied U.S. law. The lesson to be learned from this case was that,
even when substantively following precedent from the United States, it is best
not to be seen to follow it: Courts endorsing a U.S. approach should at least call
it by another name (thus, Canada now has a "weeding out" test, as opposed to
the American equivalent, the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test). Similarly,
in Robertson (CA.), supra note 94, the Ontario Court of Appeal criticized the
motions judge for overlooking Canadian-U.S. differences when apparently
following the U.S. authority of N.Y Times Co. v. Tasini, (2001) 533 U.S. 483,
121 S. Ct. 2381 (2d. Cir. 2001). The majority of the Court went out of its way to
stress that it was not guided in its reasoning by the U.S. approach, but ultimately
arrived at what was essentially the same conclusion. The same reasoning was
later affirmed by a majority at the Supreme Court in Robertson (S.C.C.), supra
note 2 at para. 43: "[C]aution must be adhered to when referencing Tasini in
the Canadian context due to differences in the applicable governing
legislation.... Nonetheless, we find the reasoning ... compelling and
applicable."
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be easily transferable to Canada given the key differences in the
copyright concepts in Canadian and American copyright
legislation."'' 46 It is therefore conceivable that the "skill and
judgment" test was intended to resemble the creativity test both in
substance and effect, albeit without going so far as to explicitly
adopt the American terminology and thus appear to undermine
these supposedly "key differences".
Such a conclusion would be important in two respects. First, it
would underscore the similarities between the two tests in their
application, emphasizing that Canadian copyright protection for
information compilations should be just as "thin" as it is in the
United States. When interpreting the "skill and judgment"
standard, Canadian courts need not begin with the assumption that
it catches more works than the U.S. standard. 47 If the prevailing
assumption is that Canada has a lower standard, the temptation
will be to reduce it to a point where, once again, everything makes
the bar. If it is accepted that the Canadian standard will produce
what is effectively a "creativity" threshold, there is a better chance
that "skill and judgment" will indeed raise the bar of
copyrightability, ensuring that information remains free, and that
the public domain has room to flourish.
Secondly, this conclusion would have important implications
for the perceived role of the originality doctrine in the copyright
system. Irrespective of the Supreme Court's refusal to explicitly
follow Feist, if it were understood that the American and
Canadian standards are essentially the same, Canadian courts may
be more receptive to the principles and policies that underlie U.S.
originality jurisprudence. Specifically, from this perspective, it
may be acknowledged that the instrumental role attributed to
"creativity" in Feist equally describes the role that "skill and
146 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 355.
147 The Ontario Court of Appeal in Robertson (CA.) described the CCH
(S.C.C.) originality ruling in these terms: "[U]nlike the jurisprudence in the
United States, a work is considered to be original and the subject of full
copyright protection, even if creativity is not present. According to the court, the
creativity standard of originality in the United States is too high": Robertson
(C.A.), supra note 94 at 497. It is easy to see how this description might lead to a
threshold significantly lower than the U.S. threshold, and so, in my opinion,
lower than that intended by the Supreme Court.
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judgment" ought to perform in Canada. 148 In other words,
requiring works to meet a threshold of "skill and judgment" is a
route by which to "implement copyright's policy of
encouragement, and thus achieve the optimal result for promoting
the public interest."' 149 Essentially, the Supreme Court should be
understood to have decided that only works displaying "skill and
judgment" warrant the encouragement that copyright affords:
Copyright should encourage authors to employ their skill and
judgment in the creation of intellectual works because these are
the works that further the public interest at the heart of copyright.
The ruling of the Supreme Court, therefore, brought the
Canadian position closer to the American approach, both by
elevating the originality standard and by justifying that elevation
with the conviction that a higher standard is the best way to
achieve copyright's purposes. 5° In this sense, the ruling may
represent a subtle endorsement of the American approach, albeit
nominally reconfigured for the Canadian context, within which a
so-called "creativity" standard could not easily have functioned in
the same way. The ruling, therefore, restores some substance to
originality in Canada, and recognizes that originality is
148 In Feist, O'Connor J. stated that "[t]he primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts': supra note 6 at 349.
149 Pessach, supra note 123 at 43, explains: "[The] utilitarian philosophy of
copyright, which characterizes American copyright law and its constitutional
merits, was declared by the Feist court as its compass in determining what
'originality' means. The court's conclusion was that by imposing a requirement
of creativity it would fulfill and best serve the public interest". He continues:
"This conviction about the utilitarian basis and the public-oriented justification
of copyright in American law was no more than a declaration of a long tradition
in American copyright law. What was novel about the court's decision was the
conviction that the requirement of creativity was the correct and desired way to
implement copyright's policy of encouragement, and thus achieve the optimal
result for promoting the public interest. Although it was not stated literally in the
court's decision, put in economic terms, the court's decision presumed that in a
cost-benefit analysis of copyright law, only works with an element of creativity
warranted the grant of a copyright" [footnotes omitted].
150 1 have argued elsewhere that "the CCH case is to Canada what Feist is to
the U.S." on that basis that both cases "looked beyond the interests of the
purported rights-bearer and made an appeal to the public policy goals of
copyright law": Craig, "Evolution of Originality", supra note 17 at 437.
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instrumental to the goals of the copyright system: The application
of an originality doctrine is a means by which to encourage the
creation and dissemination of "works of the arts and intellect".' 5
C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE REJECTION OF "CREATIVITY"
This discussion suggests that "creativity" in Canada had become a
loaded term: weighed down by connotations of quality or
objective novelty, by personality-based theories of the author's
inherent right, and by undertones of Americanization perceived as
threats to the Anglo-Canadian tradition. The Supreme Court of
Canada chose to exclude the term "creativity" from the originality
doctrine, notwithstanding its decision to elevate the threshold. The
decision to omit "creativity" from the originality requirement may
prevent courts from employing the kind of exclusionary standard
used by the Trial Judge in CCH, and should reduce the judicial
inclination to assess copyrightability with reference to the
perceived quality of the work (thereby achieving the commonly-
stated benefits of a sweat-based standard). However, by requiring
some "skill and judgment", the new test also avoids the
"evisceration" of originality's meaning.
While the distinction between "a minimum amount of
creativity" and a "more than trivial amount of skill and judgment"
may prove negligible in application, the implications for Canadian
copyright policy and theory should not be ignored: The choice to
exclude "creativity" from the test restricts the potential force of
personality-based theories in Canadian copyright, avoids
significant upset to the civil and common law equilibrium, and
appears to resist the tendency towards Americanization. At the
same time, however, it makes room for an instrumental approach
to originality determinations not dissimilar to that found in the
United States, according to which the goals of the copyright
system can act as a "compass in determining what 'originality'
means." 152
151 Thberge, supra note 99 at 355.
152 Pessach, supra note 123 at 19.
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VI. CONCLUSION: CCH AND THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF
ORIGINALITY
Canada now has a definitive statement of the originality standard
against which works are to be measured and copyright conferred;
this is a significant improvement upon the previously uncertain
state of Canadian originality jurisprudence. However, the
presence of sufficient "skill and judgment" will be a matter of
degree to be decided on the facts of each case. It is apparent that
the test has the potential to slip towards a very low threshold: A
compiler who employs a practiced aptitude for gathering data, and
decides what data to include, may be granted rights over his data
selection. Equally, the test could establish a relatively high
threshold: Someone who makes creative choices in producing a
work could conceivably be denied the status of original author if
those choices demonstrate no particular skill, aptitude, or
ability. 
5 3
With such subjective and malleable concepts, and this degree
of judicial discretion, courts are likely to return to first principles
to determine whether the standard for protection has been met.
Specifically, courts' decisions will likely depend upon the
perceived equities of the case, which will, in turn, depend upon
the perceived purposes of copyright law. If copyright is believed
to be a reward for labour, then the "skill and judgment" threshold
is likely to be low. If copyright is believed to be a right flowing
from authorial creativity, then the "skill and judgment" threshold
is likely to be higher. I would suggest that courts should rather
have regard to the larger legal principles and policies that emanate
from the CCH judgment. The substance of Canada's new
originality doctrine should be determined, and its application
informed, by the purposive spirit in which it appears to have been
conceived.
When Canadian courts interpret and apply the "skill and
judgment" test, there are a few considerations that should guide
their analysis. First, they should recall that the Supreme Court
153 Cf Scassa, "Recalibrating Copyright Law?", supra note 107 at 91: "The
Canadian standard embraces a broad range of utilitarian works while raising the
spectre of more subjective interpretations of copyright in the traditional
categories of copyright works."
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excluded "labour" from its test. Therefore, Canadian courts ought
to recognize that copyright is no longer to be granted as a reward
for mere industriousness. As a related point, courts should
remember that a primary motivation behind the decision to
exclude "labour" was the desire to ensure that information
remains in the public domain. Courts assuming that the "skill and
judgment" threshold is lower than the U.S. equivalent should
ensure that their interpretation of Canada's originality standard
does not permit a de facto monopoly over information contained
in a copyrightable work.
Secondly, courts should bear in mind that the Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected any requirement of "creativity". I have
suggested that, implicitly, the Court may have sought to avoid the
philosophical and political implications of the creativity standard.
In particular, the Court perhaps intended to avoid "creativity" in
the sense used in the Tele-Direct case: as concomitant with the
droit d'auteur. Therefore, it would be appropriate for Canadian
courts assessing "skill and judgment" to leave aside romantic
authorship ideals and the personality-based theories of individual
entitlement. As a related point, it is clear that the Supreme Court
meant to avoid external, qualitative evaluations of a work's worth
or contribution. Courts assuming that "skill and judgment" has
significantly elevated our originality threshold should take care to
avoid turning "skill and judgment" into a merit-based assessment
of an author's contribution.
The third and final factor for consideration is that the Supreme
Court did all of this in an apparent attempt to strike the
appropriate balance between authors' just rewards and the
public's interests, and thereby further the stated purposes of the
Copyright Act. 54 It should follow that the author's "just reward"
is fair compensation for the exercise of "skill and judgment" in
154 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 355-56. The Court described as the
purpose of copyright "to balance the public interest in promoting the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining
a just reward for the creator. When courts adopt a standard of originality
requiring only that something be more than a mere copy or that someone simply
show industriousness to ground copyright in a work, they tip the scale in favour
of the author's or creator's rights, at the loss of society's interest in maintaining a
robust public domain."
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the production of a work of art and intellect, and not an
entitlement flowing from the investment of labour or personality.
Rather than asking questions about the origin and scope of the
author's entitlement, courts should now ask questions about the
kinds of works that ought to be protected, and those that ought to
remain in the public domain, in light of copyright's policy goals.
Because the "skill and judgment" test straddles several critical
theoretical and practical divides, it seems clear that the
"appropriate" and "workable" balance that the Supreme Court
claims to have struck'55 is tentative and fragile at best.
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However, by potentially freeing originality from the loaded
assumptions that have defined and disrupted it for so long, the
CCH case has provided a much-needed opportunity for its re-
imagination. Because the Supreme Court resisted a "sweat of the
brow" approach, removed "labour" per se from the subsistence
determination, and avoided the language of "creativity", future
courts can and should interpret and apply the originality standard
without resort to the notion of copyright as a natural entitlement
of the author, whether born of the investment of labour or
personality. Rather, Canadian courts should appreciate the
renewed instrumentality of copyright's originality doctrine.
155 CCH (S.C.C.), supra note 7 at 356.
156 See Craig, "Evolution of Originality", supra note 17 at 440-42.
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